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I. INTRODUCTION
There is nothing controversial about saying, as Alexander Bickel did
in The Least Dangerous Branch in 1962, “that judicial review is a countermajoritarian force . . . .”1 When one gives an unelected judiciary the power to
declare null and void laws enacted by popularly elected representatives, there
automatically exists the possibility that those jurists will rule counter to the
wishes of a majority. To be sure, the existence of this judicial power creates
fundamental problems in a constitutional democracy, and many forests have
been felled in the scholarly quest to analyze those problems. As Bickel
observed, the counter-majoritarian nature of judicial review is the root
difficulty in the American judicial system. He also noted, however, that this
force is an “ineluctable reality.”2 It is therefore misleading to argue that,
“empirical studies of judicial review have consistently found that Bickel’s
‘difficulty’ does not actually exist.”3 The difficulty of which Bickel wrote
did, and most definitely does, continue to exist. Unpacking the socio-political
factors that influence the way in which the “difficulty” manifests itself in
judicial decision-making has prompted the aforementioned studies.
*
Assistant Professor of Political Science, SUNY Oswego. Email: helen.knowles@oswego.edu. I
am grateful for the feedback I received, on much earlier drafts of this essay, from Beau Breslin, Mark
Graber, Steven Lichtman, and Kevin McMahon. Additionally, the arguments made in this Article have
greatly benefited from an ongoing series of conversations about “popular constitutionalism” that have
occurred both on and off panels at recent annual meetings of the New England Political Science
Association and the Northeastern Political Science Association.
1
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 16 (1962).
2
Id.
3
Matthew E. K. Hall, Rethinking Regime Politics, 37 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 878, 878 (2012).
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However, those studies have never shown, because they never could show,
that the “difficulty,” as Bickel defined it, “does not actually exist.”4
If we view The Least Dangerous Branch as a monologue on the
problematic counter-majoritarian nature of judicial review in America’s
constitutional democracy, then the central question that Bickel seems to pose
is: “who should authoritatively interpret the U.S. Constitution?” This Article
contends that Bickel’s analysis is instead dominated by a different question,
namely: “how should the U.S. Supreme Court interpret the Constitution?” At
first blush, this suggests that the concerns and principles animating The Least
Dangerous Branch are very different from those comprising the works of the
“popular constitutionalism” movement that arose in the 1990s, works which
are dominated by the “who?” question. Yet, upon closer inspection, one finds
much in common between Bickel’s book and the arguments set forth by the
advocates and defenders of “popular constitutionalism.” Both accept that the
Supreme Court has an important role to play in authoritatively interpreting
the Constitution. Neither Bickel nor the popular constitutionalists reject, or
even advocate the eschewal of judicial review. As we will see, this becomes
clear when we focus on the intellectual heart of that book, namely Bickel’s
elucidation of the passive virtues that the Supreme Court can choose to draw
upon in its work.
II. “BRING[ING] . . . THE PEOPLE BACK IN[TO]”5 THE
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE
Just like the counter-majoritarian difficulty, at its core “popular
constitutionalism” is easy to define. The principal belief shared by popular
constitutionalists is that greater interpretive authority should be placed in the
hands of “The People.” The “basic principle,” Larry D. Kramer contends, is
“the idea that ordinary citizens,” rather than the courts, “are our most
authoritative interpreters of the Constitution . . .”6 As Mark Tushnet suggests,
“popular constitutionalism” is underpinned by a belief that the courts should
not have “normative priority in the conversation” about the meaning of the
U.S. Constitution.7 In other words, the “popular constitutionalism”
movement refuses to bestow its uncritical acceptance and adulation upon the
grand, and rather tendentious judicial proclamation, in Marbury v. Madison,
that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is.”8
“Popular constitutionalism” has, however, spawned a literature that
Id.
Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Book Review, Bringing the People Back In: The People Themselves: Popular
Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 653, 655 (2005).
6
Larry D. Kramer, Undercover Anti-Populism, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1343, 1344 (2005).
7
Mark Tushnet, Popular Constitutionalism as Political Law, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 991, 999 (2006).
8
5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
4
5
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makes it seem anything but simple.9 This is in part the fault of its principal
advocates. For example, the rhetoric that Tushnet employs in Taking the
Constitution Away from the Courts10 (one of the most significant “popular
constitutionalism” books) is oftentimes radical and inflammatory. It can leave
one with the misleading impression that the author’s understanding of
“popular constitutionalism” is anti-Marbury instead of anti-judicial
supremacy. To be sure, Tushnet advocates some form of protection for the
people (some kind of non-parchment, prophylactic device), but the option he
has in mind is probably not “systemic judicial castration.” Rather, it is closer
to the “series of cold showers” that Kramer’s work seems to advocate.11
“Seems to” is deliberately italicized because, like Tushnet, Kramer has left
his readers confused about exactly what his conception of “popular
constitutionalism” is. Kramer has earned the “Founding Father”12 of modern
“popular constitutionalism” appellation because of his 2004 book The People
Themselves.13 However, that book built upon his 2001 Harvard Law Review
Foreword,14 an article where his ostensibly historical analysis was infected by
his negative reaction to the U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent “supremacist”
decisions, especially Bush v. Gore.15
Kramer’s argument was forcefully directed towards advocating
“popular constitutionalism” as a cure for the judicial supremacy ills imposed
upon the nation by the Rehnquist Court. The article, like chapter seven of
Tushnet’s book, read like a decision-driven screed against the perceived
conservative “judicial activism” of that Court. The People Themselves was
primarily a historical work that investigated the constitutional conversations
that occurred between different federal departments, as well as those
departments and the people, throughout the development of American
politics. However, its closing sentences confirmed that in many ways the
author’s conception of “popular constitutionalism” remained beholden to his
anger at what he perceived to be the recent Court’s supremacist stance.16
In recent years, readers of law journal articles would, in part because
of this literature confusion, be forgiven for thinking that “popular
constitutionalism” was a radical, elite attempt, by disaffected liberal law
professors, to overturn Marbury because the conservative federal judiciary
9
Helen J. Knowles & Julianne A. Toia, Defining “Popular Constitutionalism”: The Kramer versus
Kramer Problem, 42 S.U. L. REV. 31 (2014).
10
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
11
Steven B. Lichtman, Does Popular Constitutionalism Require a Willing Audience? 9 (May 2-4,
2013) (unpublished paper) (on file with author).
12
Tom Donnelly, Making Popular Constitutionalism Work, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 159, 163 (2012).
13
LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW (2004).
14
Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4
(2001).
15
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
16
KRAMER, supra note 13, at 248.
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cannot be trusted to “say what the law [really] is.”17 However, “popular
constitutionalism” is non-ideological, and reflects concerns about judicial
supremacy that are not new. The modern movement probably emerged (its
exact origins are hard to pinpoint) as a “distinct scholarly phenomenon” in the
1990s, and found its most prominent voice in the writings of Tushnet and
Kramer.18 However, it “is largely a rediscovery of a very basic feature of our
constitutional culture that goes back to the Founding and has persisted to the
present day.”19 That feature involves living with, rather than seeking to
abandon, judicial review. It involves living with the narrow “power to ignore
unconstitutional acts when resolving cases” (judicial review), and expressing
concern about “the power to establish principles that bind all other political
actors” (judicial supremacy).20 In other words, “popular constitutionalism”
seeks to “bring . . . the people back” into the constitutional dialogue,21 thereby
empowering “all [of those] other political actors.”
A concern about judicial supremacy is a central conceptual
characteristic of both “popular constitutionalism” and The Least Dangerous
Branch. However, Bickel’s attempt to unpack and analyze the ways in which
the Supreme Court should be engaging in authoritative constitutional
interpretation often gets lost in discussions of his seminal book. Bickel was
not anti-judicial review, as the “academic obsession”22 with the countermajoritarian difficulty suggests. Instead he was anti-judicial supremacy.
Consequently, our attention should be focused––as was Bickel’s––on a
discussion of the Supreme Court’s “passive virtues.”
III. WHITHER THE PASSIVE VIRTUES?
A year before the publication of The Least Dangerous Branch, Bickel
fleshed out many of that book’s arguments in a Harvard Law Review
Foreword, an article whose title––“The Passive Virtues”––perfectly
summarized its content.23 To be sure, the concept of the Court as a countermajoritarian institution was evident within its pages, but Bickel did not focus
on the “who should authoritatively interpret the U.S. Constitution?” question.
Instead, he accepted that the Supreme Court had the power of judicial review.
Consequently, he proceeded to sketch out his responses to the “how should
the U.S. Supreme Court interpret the Constitution?” inquiry. Many of those
Knowles & Toia, supra note 9.
Lee J. Strang, Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism?: Theoretical Possibilities and Practical
Differences, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 259 (2011).
19
Jack M. Balkin, Jack Balkin’s Constitutional Text and Principle: Nine Perspectives on Living
Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 815, 863 (2012).
20
MARK A. GRABER, A NEW INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 101 (2013).
21
Hulsebosch, supra note 5, at 655.
22
Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 159 (2002).
23
Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term: Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV.
L. REV. 40 (1961).
17
18
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observations became sections of chapter four of The Least Dangerous
Branch.
It is no trivial observation to note that at 88 pages, that chapter––also
called “The Passive Virtues”––is twice the length of the next longest chapter.
Its disproportionate length does not translate into analytical verbosity. This
was not a case of minding the quality and feeling the width. For it is this
section that is home to the book’s intellectual heart, a heart that Bickel
succinctly described in the following way:
One of the chief faculties of the judiciary, which is lacking in
the legislature and which fits the courts for the function of
evolving and applying constitutional principles, is that the
judgment of courts can come later, after the hopes and
prophecies expressed in legislation have been tested in the
actual workings of our society. . . .24
The Court’s power of judicial review, wrote Bickel, “looms, for the most part,
in the background.”25 By contrast, its passive virtues––its ways of “not
doing”––constitute “the foreground.”26
The “techniques of not doing” were described by Bickel as “devices
for disposing of a case while avoiding judgment on the constitutional issue it
raises.”27 These included faithfully adhering to the doctrines of ripeness and
standing, cautiously exercising the power to grant writs of certiorari,
respecting the importance of the doctrines of vagueness and delegation (both
parts of the concept of desuetude), and maintaining a keen judicial awareness
of the fundamental importance of the political question doctrine.28 In a
constitutional democracy, all of these “devices” have the inestimable value of
providing the judiciary with its own ways to delay (or avoid) becoming
involved in the dialogue of constitutionalism.29 In other words, they facilitate
a respect for the significant differences between judicial review and judicial
supremacy.
IV. THEORETICAL AND FACTUAL FATALITIES?
If “popular constitutionalism” seeks to “bring the people back” into
the constitutional dialogue, one might justifiably enquire about the identity of
those “political actors.”30 What has it meant, over the course of American
history, to argue that courts should not have “normative priority in the
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

BICKEL, supra note 1, at 115.
Id. at 235.
Id.
Id. at 169.
Id. at 111–98.
Id. at 115.
Hulsebosch, supra note 5, at 655; GRABER, supra note 20, at 101.
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conversation” about the meaning of the U.S. Constitution?31 Is “popular
constitutionalism” an endorsement of jury nullification? Can it mean the
recall of elected judges? What about Jeffersonian departmentalism? Or even
mob rule? Some works have demonstrated a few of the ways in which
“popular constitutionalism” can be operationalized,32 but there is no literary
consensus about just what makes a reaction to judicial supremacy a valid
exercise of this concept. “Popular constitutionalism” can easily be viewed as
fatal in theory and fact (to borrow Gerald Gunther’s pithy phrase).33 As a
theoretical construct, it all too often lends itself to the conclusion that it is the
pursuit of unworkable and unrealistic goals––all popular sovereignty pomp
and no circumstance––one might say.
To an extent, the same criticism can be leveled at The Least
Dangerous Branch, for that book is thought-provoking and question-begging,
but oftentimes not question-answering. Indeed, ironically it does its best not
to decide many things. Its theory of passive virtues leaves much to the
imagination––in the words of Edward Purcell, it is an “ultimately amorphous”
theory.34
Bickel provided his readers with a list of the judicial “passive
virtues,” but those readers could be forgiven for believing that Bickel was not
completely committed to his own theory. It was too easy to conclude, as
Professor Gunther famously did, that Bickel had a “100% insistence on
principle, 20% of the time.”35 It was too easy to imagine cases that on the one
hand should elicit, from Bickel, a “don’t decide that” (take the virtuous high
road of judicial passivity) response but in which, on the other hand, it instead
was also all too easy to imagine the liberal Professor Bickel defending the
advantages of judicial aggressiveness (an ideological pick-and-choose
accusation which, as mentioned above, can also be leveled at “popular
constitutionalism”).
V. REAPPORTIONMENT: A PARTICULARLY THORNY THICKET
Writing the Harvard Law Review Foreword that reviewed the
Supreme Court’s October 1960 Term provided Bickel with an important
opportunity to preview the content of his forthcoming book. That November
1961 article has rightly come to be viewed as a classic Foreword, something
Tushnet, supra note 7, at 999.
See GEORGE I. LOVELL, THIS IS NOT CIVIL RIGHTS: DISCOVERING RIGHTS TALK IN 1939 AMERICA
(2012); Emily Zackin, Popular Constitutionalism's Hard When You're Not Very Popular: Why the ACLU
Turned to Courts, 42 L. & SOC’Y REV. 367 (2008); Helen J. Knowles, Seeing the Light: Lysander Spooner’s
Increasingly Popular Constitutionalism, 31 L. & HIST. REV. 531 (2013).
33
Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
34
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Alexander M. Bickel and the Post-Realist Constitution, 11 HARV. CIV. RTS.
& CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 537, 541 (1976).
35
Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues” – A Comment on Principle and
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1964).
31
32
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that is no mean feat given the prestige that attaches to those articles.36
However, in delineating the relationship between The Least Dangerous
Branch and “popular constitutionalism,” there is just as much analytical value
in consulting another Bickel-authored article––“The Durability of Colegrove
v. Green”––that appeared in November 1962 (at the same time as the book).37
For it is in that article that we find a Bickelian explanation of the passive
virtues, which is an explanation that (a) has greater operational clarity than
The Least Dangerous Branch, and (b) is applied to the study of a judicial
decision that at first blush would seem to betray the “passive virtues,” but
which upon closer examination is ultimately a very good vehicle for Bickel
to expound upon his theory.
“The Durability of Colegrove v. Green” was Bickel’s contribution to
a Yale Law Journal symposium on the Supreme Court’s landmark decision,
eight months earlier, in Baker v. Carr.38 In Baker, the Court held that
legislative apportionment was a justiciable issue39 ––it was not a subject
matter that raised purely political questions, questions that could only be
settled at the ballot box. It was a monumental decision that essentially
overruled the Court’s 1946 decision in Colegrove (at the very least it can be
said to have rendered that precedent legally irrelevant).40 Chief Justice Earl
Warren later identified Baker as “the most important case of my tenure on the
Court.”41 As Thomas I. Emerson argued in one of the articles that
accompanied Bickel’s contribution to the Yale symposium, Baker was “a
momentous step forward in utilizing law and legal principle for the
maintenance and invigoration of the democratic structure of our society and
in the assumption of a positive role by the Supreme Court in that task.” 42
Bickel also approved of the decision, but his analysis was far less sanguine.
He began and ended with expressions of caution; urban voters were advised
against putting all their collective hopes and dreams of greater electoral
fairness into one judicial basket, and the nine justices were encouraged to
exhibit restraint in future apportionment cases––to resist the temptation of
unnecessarily wading further into the metaphorical “political thicket.”43
The “political thicket” metaphor was the legal linguistic creation of
Justice Felix Frankfurter, for whom Bickel clerked during the October 1952
Term. The metaphor was a fundamental component of Frankfurter’s majority
opinion in Colegrove. It stood for a “school of thought of which Mr. Justice
Frankfurter has been the intellectual and spiritual leader,” a school of judicial
36
See Mark Tushnet & Timothy Lynch, The Project of the Harvard Forewords: A Social and
Intellectual Inquiry, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 463, 474–77 (1994).
37
Alexander M. Bickel, The Durability of Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE L.J. 39, 39–45 (1962).
38
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
39
Id.
40
328 U.S. 549 (1946).
41
EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 306 (1977).
42
Thomas I. Emerson, Malapportionment and Judicial Power, 72 YALE L.J. 65, 79 (1962).
43
Bickel, supra note 37, at 39, 44–45.
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restraint.44 Frankfurter concluded:
The remedy for unfairness in districting is to secure State
legislatures that will apportion properly, or to invoke the
ample powers of Congress. . . . The Constitution has left the
performance of many duties in our governmental scheme to
depend on the fidelity of the executive and legislative action
and, ultimately, on the vigilance of the people in exercising
their political rights.45
Apportionment of legislative districts was one such duty. As Frankfurter
wrote in the dissent in Baker (a case that was a “‘massive repudiation’” of his
jurisprudence),46 “[a]ppeal must be to an informed, civically militant
electorate. In a democratic society like ours, relief must come through an
aroused popular conscience that sears the conscience of the people’s
representatives.”47 Frankfurter, who retired from the Court four months later,
suffered a stroke on April 5, two weeks after the announcement of Baker. It
was a stroke that Frankfurter is reported to have attributed to the exertion of
penning his bitter and ferocious dissent in that case.48
In so many ways, Frankfurter had been Bickel’s mentor. Perhaps
more significantly, however, it can be said that the Justice was “Bickel’s
jurisprudential progenitor.”49 One might think, therefore, that the decision in
Baker was a very bitter pill for Bickel to swallow. In actuality, it was not a
difficult judgment for the Professor to accept. In Baker, Frankfurter saw no
more reason to pass a judgment of judicial condemnation upon the legislative
failure to reapportion in Tennessee than he had done in Colegrove, which
addressed malapportionment in Illinois. Bickel, by contrast, looked upon the
situation in the Volunteer State and realized that judicial intervention was
imperative. For too long self-interested legislators in Tennessee had ignored
the shifting patterns of population, demonstrating that their “conscience” was
impenetrable, it could not be “sear[ed]” by the “aroused popular conscience”
of which Frankfurter had written in Colegrove.
In this respect, Bickel’s views about Baker strongly resembled those
held by Archibald Cox, another one of Frankfurter’s mentees. As President
Kennedy’s Solicitor General of the United States, Cox was responsible for
deciding in which of the flurry of early 1960s state apportionment cases the
federal government should file amicus briefs. These were very difficult

44
45
46
47
48
49

Emerson, supra note 42, at 79.
Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 556.
Emerson, supra note 42, at 79.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 270 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
See SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 191 (2010).
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 61 (1982).
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decisions for him.50 Indeed, on one occasion he expressed his fear that overly
aggressive judicial involvement in reapportionment would “risk” triggering
“a severe constitutional crisis.”51 However, he believed that situations existed
when “discrimination and legislative inaction [was] sufficiently invidious as
to warrant judicial action”; in 1962, Tennessee was one such example.52 As
he wrote in the Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in that case, “at
some point malapportionment of state legislatures becomes so gross and
discriminatory that it violates the Fourteenth Amendment.”53 Bickel agreed
with this assessment––Baker was “an extreme case” in which “the Court
should see its way clear to make its own judgment of necessity, overriding the
political one, and to apply the principle of equality.”54
Baker was the catalyst for a set of momentous 1963–1964
reapportionment decisions in which the Warren Court exhibited very little
Frankfurterian judicial restraint. Rather than simply decide that legislative
apportionment was a justiciable issue (as it had done in Baker), the Court
decided to pass judgment on the merits of specific state apportionment plans.
Most notably, in six cases, headlined by Reynolds v. Sims, the justices held
that the Constitution required that the boundaries of districts for elections for
both houses of every bicameral state legislature be drawn based upon
population.55
Bickel foresaw, and warned against these developments––devoting
the end of The Least Dangerous Branch to a discussion of Colegrove and
Baker.56 Intervention in Baker had been necessary but, as he had observed in
his Yale article (from which he drew liberally for the book), it was a decision
that should “be read as holding no more than that the situation in Tennessee .
. . is the result not of a deliberate if imperfect present judgment of the political
institutions, but merely of inertia and the abdication of political
responsibility.”57 He did not want it to be what it did indeed become, namely
a vehicle for much more active and aggressive (rather than passive) judicial
involvement in the ultimate “political thicket.” In unfortunately apocalyptic
terms, he described what might happen in “some future case.” The justices,
he worried, would:

50
Helen J. Knowles, May it Please the Court? The Solicitor General’s Not-So-“Special”
Relationship: Archibald Cox and the 1963–1964 Reapportionment Cases, 31 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 279 (2006).
51
Memorandum from Archibald Cox to Robert F. Kennedy (Feb. 4, 1964) (on file with author).
52
Knowles, supra note 50, at 282.
53
Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae at 10, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (No. 6), 1961 WL
101892, at *16. This brought acrimony to the previously warm relationship between Cox and Frankfurter.
See KEN GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD COX: CONSCIENCE OF A NATION 166 (1997).
54
Bickel, supra note 23, at 78.
55
377 U.S. 533 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Md. Comm. for Fair
Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Roman v. Sincock,
377 U.S. 695 (1964); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
56
See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 194–97.
57
Id. at 44.
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perhaps in order to correct misreadings by lower courts of its
present rather enigmatic pronouncement . . . see it as its
function, not merely to let an apportionment be, but to
legitimate it. This[] . . . would be a grave error. If one may
use proper nouns to name judicial errors, as is sometimes
done with diseases, we should call this Plessy v. Ferguson’s
Error . . . .58
In The Least Dangerous Branch, Bickel described the political question
doctrine as the holy grail of the Court’s passive virtues. It represented “[t]he
culmination of any progression of devices for withholding the ultimate
constitutional judgment of the Supreme Court––and in a sense their sum. . .
.”59 As Bickel believed it should be read, therefore, Baker was the judicial
epitome of both the “progression” and “sum” of the “passive virtues.”
Judicial review, but not judicial supremacy.
VI. CONCLUSION: STILL IMPORTANT AFTER ALL THESE YEARS
When it was published in 1962, Alexander Bickel’s The Least
Dangerous Branch contained a “framing device . . . that caught the attention
of the ages.”60 As Barry Friedman observes, the academy has long been
“obsessed” with the “countermajoritarian problem” of which Bickel wrote.61
Consequently, it is “[t]oo easily forgotten” that the book actually provided “a
defense of judicial review . . . .”62 Friedman is right that the “defense” was
“especially attuned to the circumstances of the time in which Bickel wrote.”63
Conceptually, however, that “defense” is of timeless relevance. Throughout
the history of the United States, the populace has (in various forms) engaged
in contemplative constitutionalism. That dialogue has often debated the
proper scope of judicial review without advocating its eradication.
In recent decades, the modern “popular constitutionalism” movement
has been a prominent (even if primarily academic) contributor to that
dialogue. Properly understood, that dialogue revolves around a belief that the
courts should not have “normative priority in the conversation” about the
meaning of the U.S. Constitution.64 As this Article has shown, “popular
constitutionalism” has much in common with the views that form the
intellectual heart of The Least Dangerous Branch. There is agreement that
judicial review plays an important role in a constitutional democracy––the
Supreme Court does expound upon the meaning of the U.S. Constitution, and
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id. at 197.
Id. at 183.
Friedman, supra note 22, at 201.
Id. at 159.
Id.
Id.
Tushnet, supra note 7, at 999.
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that is entirely legitimate.
However, none of us (especially the members of the Court) should
ever forget that sometimes that which is done best is actually that which is not
done. From this perspective, there is considerable virtue in judicial passivity,
or so Alexander Bickel would have wanted us to believe.
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